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Abstract: This article analyses the rise of populism and its discursive challenge to
global constitutionalism (GC). It shows that populist contestation ismore ambivalent
than often suggested: its challenge depends on the populist variety and can both
undermine or support liberal principles ofGC. Building on the ideational approach to
populism and a framework of transnational politicisation, a proposed typology
identifies both communitarian types of populism and cosmopolitan types of popu-
lism. Illustrative case studies of the Alternative for Germany, the Polish Law and
Justice Party, the Democracy in Europe Movement and Peru’s Alberto Fujimori
substantiate these empirically. While all cases contest a perceived lack of popular
sovereignty in a largely non-majoritarian global constitutional order, varieties of
populism present contrasting responses: communitarian types push for global
de-constitutionalisation in line with illiberal nationalist majoritarianism, while cos-
mopolitan types support global constitutionalisation according to liberal and dem-
ocratic principles. Further, neo-socialist populists campaign against neoliberal
principles in GC, but remain divided about supporting political principles beyond
the state. These findings suggest an emerging politicisation of the process of global
constitutionalisation at the societal level according to principles of democratic
legitimacy; and global constitutional differentiation depending on outcomes of these
normatively ambivalent and empirically contingent political contests.
Keywords: populism; global constitutionalism; liberalism; popular sover-
eignty; cosmopolitanism
I. The populist spectre haunting Global Constitutionalism
The contemporary rise of populism appears like an existential threat to
Global Constitutionalism (GC), as politicians like Donald Trump orMatteo
Salvini routinely ignore, discredit or actively undermine normative princi-
ples underlying global politics. Recent editorials of this journal worried that
‘far right populist authoritarian parties and leaders enjoying considerable
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successes across Europe and the US [signal a] decay of ‘the West’ […]
anchoring a normative model of global order in which commitments to
human rights, democracy and the rule of law are central’ (Kumm et al. 2017:
2). Hence, ‘from the global constitutionalist perspective Trumpism repre-
sents an attack on the three foundational features of the global constitution –
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law’ (Havercroft et al. 2018: 4).
However, the rise of populism may be more complex and ambiguous for
GC than its authoritarian and nationalist incarnations suggest. Indeed, at
the domestic level, a long-standing debate has considered populism’s rela-
tionship to constitutional principles as ‘two-faced’ (Canovan 1999) and
‘ambiguous’ (Mény and Surel 2002), depending on the state of liberal
democratic politics and the responses of other parties, institutions and voters
(Arditi 2005; Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart 2016; Bonikowski 2017).
Precariously, pure populist majoritarianism is inconsistent with liberal
democratic principles, but such regimes nonetheless rely on majoritarian
rule to be legitimate (Berman 2017; Mounk 2018). Hence, if populism
contributes to addressing defects in representative practice, it might even
function as a democratic corrective, rather than an authoritarian threat
(Rovira Kaltwasser 2012), so long as populists do not undermine constitu-
tional protections of liberal rights (Rummens 2017).
Empirical literatures also find such ambivalence: on the one hand,
principles of horizontal accountability and democratic contestation seem
to suffer where populists rule in less consolidated and executive-
dominated institutional contexts (Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Huber and
Schimpf 2016a; Houle and Kenny 2018; Kyle and Mounk 2018; Ruth
2018). On the other hand, where populism is in opposition, where democ-
racy is more consolidated or where the institutional system is robust
enough to prevent executive power-grabs, populist challenges may show
corrective effects for overall democratic quality, participation and repre-
sentation (Huber and Schimpf 2016b; Andreadis and Stavrakakis 2017;
Hawkins and Ruth 2017).
Importantly, beyond institutional factors and opposition status, the spe-
cific sub-type of populism also appears to be a relevant factor for its
democratic influence: only radical right populists consistently undermine
minority rights and mutual constraints across contexts (Huber and Ruth
2017; Huber and Schimpf 2017). In contrast, more inclusive types of
populist challengemay bemore likely to contribute to potentially corrective,
democratising reform (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; March 2017;
Mouffe 2018): after all, leftist politicians like Bernie Sanders in the US or the
Spanish Podemos Party appear squarely opposed to authoritarian ‘Trump-
ism’ despite being populists.
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However, existing labels of ‘right’ and ‘left’ populism are also criticised as
insufficient to discriminate between varieties of populism: some authors
equate cases qua their shared populism as increasingly similar in nationalism
and authoritarianism (Halikiopoulou, Nanou and Vasilopoulou 2012;
March 2017: 284–6). Others warn against such a conflating tendency and
critically examine the ‘reified association’ of populism and right-wing
nationalist authoritarianism (Stavrakakis et al. 2017) or communitarianism
(Ingram 2017). Indeed, the possibility of more transnational variants of
populism has started to be theorised (De Cleen 2017; Moffitt 2017).
Against this backdrop, the populist relationship to global constitution-
alism (GC) thus requires further scrutiny: how do varieties of populism
discursively challenge normative principles beyond the state binding
politics?
Themain argument of this article is that populism challenges liberal GC in
equally ambivalent ways which depend on its host-ideological variety.
Populism engages in a contestation of global institutions via the discursive
advance of ideology which may either contribute to undermining demo-
cratic politics or to pointing out and reforming normative flaws in its
practice. Specifying distinct varieties, I identify four populist discursive
challenges to GC by extending the classic distinction between exclusionary
and inclusionary populism and empirically illustrate these through explor-
atory case studies of the German Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Polish
Law and Justice Party (PiS), theDemocracy in EuropeMovement (DiEM25)
and Peru’s Alberto Fujimori.
While all populists contest a perceived lack of popular sovereignty inGC, I
show that there are both, communitarian types of populism presenting an
illiberal and authoritarian threat, but also cosmopolitan types of populism
which may challenge GC on behalf of liberal and democratic principles. In
two sub-types, the majoritarian challenge to political frameworks at the
global level is additionally combined with targeting liberal economic prin-
ciples beyond the state binding politics. Finally, important contemporary
examples of ‘left’ populism fall between these ideal types, highlighting key
ideological ambiguities in their discursive quest for power.
Two main implications derive from these findings: First, contemporary
varieties of populism present distinct challenges to normative principles
beyond the state. In this regard, communitarian populism pushes towards
global de-constitutionalisation by targeting the liberal and democratic pil-
lars of GC,while cosmopolitan populism advances discourses strengthening
liberal-democratic GC. Neo-socialist versions of both types seek to alter
neoliberal economic choices enshrined beyond the state, and some such
contemporary cases remain torn between supporting or opposing liberal
political principles ofGC.Overall, varieties of populism therefore illuminate
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the contours of an emerging discursive contest between principles of undem-
ocratic (neo-)liberalism, illiberal democracy and democratic liberalism as
alternative visions of democratically legitimate global normative frame-
works.
Second, in contrast to existing functional accounts of global constitutio-
nalisation, an increasing politicisation of the constitutional process at the
societal level is therefore apparent where such populists emerge. According
to ideational theories, institutional consequences of such politicised contests
depend on other parties’ behaviour, contextual opportunity structures and
the choices of voters. Estimating direct effects of populist contestation on
GC is elusive given these contingencies, but constitutional differentiation
according to context appears more likely than uniform constitutional
demise.
While the rise of populism politicises normative principles binding global
politics, the fate of GC is thus in no way foretold. The specific populist
challenge, as well as the choices of key actors in contexts with different
driving forces all influence how the discursive contests over global consti-
tutionalisation unfold. Within this process, nuance towards both populism
and the normative practice of global institutions is essential to discursively
and politically defend the global constitutionalist project where justified, to
sustain it where possible and to improve it where necessary.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section II defines
global constitutionalism and its normative features. Section III develops a
typology of populism in a context of transnational politicisation which
Section IV empirically substantiates through illustrative case studies.
Section V analyses the relationship of contemporary populist challenges to
global constitutional principles, before SectionVI draws implications for the
process of global constitutionalisation and its possible trajectories. A final
section concludes.
II. Global Constitutionalism: The global constitutionalisation
of liberal principles
Global constitutionalism (GC) is a social phenomenon which results from a
qualitative shift from globalisation to constitutionalisation of world politics
(Wiener et al. 2012). In a partially global political system, constitutional
frameworks binding politics through normative principles embodied in law
are increasingly integrated with global processes of constitutionalisation as
contained in legal institutions beyond the state (Lang and Wiener 2017;
Zürn 2018).
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In its current variant, global constitutionalisation refers to the global legal
and political order increasingly resting on the normative basis of principles
derived from liberal values of individual self-determination (Barnett and
Finnemore 2005). These principles are commonly seen as represented by
human rights, the rule of law, democracy as well as market-based produc-
tion and allocation of resources (Dunoff and Trachtman 2009; Gill and
Cutler 2012; Tushnet 2019). Specifically, global liberal political principles
constrain negative externalities of national politics such as unilateralism and
the use of state violence and human rights violations for political goals
(Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 2009).
Similarly, global (neo-)liberal economic principles limit national political
autonomy to prevent negative spillover of protectionism and to facilitate the
operation of international capital- and goods markets (Hall and Biersteker
2002; Gill and Cutler 2012).
Authority resting on these principles is encapsulated in international legal
institutions which either constrain or enact policy towards individuals
(in the form of human rights or investor protections) and states (in the form
of rules-based multilateralism) (Barnett and Finnemore 2005; Hooghe et al.
2017; Zürn 2018). By resting on and shaping international law, these
institutions bind global and domestic politics according to (neo-)liberal
principles.
In the absence of global authority with coercive power over states, this
way of binding politics depends on legitimacy, i.e. its social acceptance by
rule-addressees (Zürn, Binder and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012). In democracies,
specifically, the social acceptance of international authority hangs on con-
gruence with the liberal democratic principles which are normatively
expected by citizens to guide politics (Weßels 2016). As put by Allan
Buchanan and Robert Keohane: ‘The perception of legitimacy matters,
because, in a democratic era, multilateral institutions will only thrive if they
are viewed as legitimate by democratic publics’ (2006: 407). Hence, if global
constitutional authority is not perceived as liberal and democratic, its social
acceptancemay decrease, ultimately threatening its capacity to bind politics.
Liberal democratic principles of politics require balancing (1) the liberal
protection of individual and minority rights; as well as (2) democratic
majority rule (or popular sovereignty) (Ulbricht 2018). As such, these
regimes rely on liberal institutions strengthening inclusive participation on
equal terms by limiting majority rule and democratic public contestation
over majoritarian authority to maximise ‘continuous responsiveness of
government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals’
(Dahl 1971: 1). In turn, authority responsiveness requires both, citizens’
rights to evaluate (dis-)satisfactory decision outcomes, and the capacity to
use such judgments to shape future decisions via democratic contestation
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and participation (Powell 2004). In addition to legal protections of individ-
ual and minority rights, political legitimacy in democracies therefore is
sourced from the output of decision-making and from the means to change
dissatisfactory decisions via democratic input.
Both pillars of liberal democratic legitimacy are affected by institutions
beyond the state. Constitutional limitations on majoritarian politics are
particularly prominent in GC: most decision-making is delegated to quasi-
constitutional non-majoritarian institutions such as courts, technocratic
bureaucracies or expert bodies as well as pooled in International Organisa-
tions (IOs) deciding on the basis of agreed rules (Thatcher and Sweet 2002;
Hooghe and Marks 2015). Similarly, the constitutionalisation of (neo-)
liberal economic principles enshrines market mechanisms as economic
and social frameworks which are deemed superior to guide politics (Gill
and Cutler 2012; Scharpf 2017).
In addition to constitutional constraints beyond the state, the popular
sovereignty pillar of democratic legitimacy also has international dimen-
sions: on the one hand, authoritative global markets and IOs affect social
outcomes alongside decisions by domestic, democratically elected politi-
cians (Hall and Biersteker 2002; Zürn, Binder and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012). If
part of the legitimation of authority in democracies is that political decision-
making yields outcomes deemed as satisfactory by citizens, collectively-
binding decision output by IOs may thus become subject of democratic
legitimacy evaluations (Zürn 2004; Steffek 2015; Kreuder-Sonnen and
Rittberger 2019).
On the other hand, as a result of the constitutional, non-majoritarian
nature of much authority beyond the state, the input-side of the democratic
pillar is less developed inGC (Besson 2009). In principle, this side of popular
self-determination is institutionalised through the sovereignty of national
democratic states, legitimating international politics through consented
delegation or pooling of authority by elected governments (Moravcsik
2002; Hooghe and Marks 2015). Once delegated, however, most
decision-making of authoritative international institutions is not publicly
contestable through processes of public deliberation, democratic competi-
tion and executive accountability, in contrast to domestic constitutional
orders (Follesdal andHix 2006; Tsakatika 2007). Such public contestability
of authority, however, is a key requirement to ensure responsiveness of
authorities to citizen preferences and hence democratic quality in (global)
political institutions (Dahl 1971: 2). While there are also rare ‘pockets’ of
majoritarian politics beyond the national level to contest policy choice and
constitutional frameworks, these remain limited in authority and transna-
tional character (Freyburg, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2017; Rocabert
et al. 2019).
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In sum, institutions of GC thus affect both the liberal democratic princi-
ples of constitutional rights and checks on majoritarian excess as well as
popular sovereignty over authoritative decision-making. Yet, the (neo-)
liberal constitutional pillar dominates over limited opportunities for demo-
cratic policy choice or constitutional reform in a largely non-majoritarian
global order. As I discuss next, the legitimacy in practice of global authority
resting on these normative bases represents a focal point of the populist
challenge in liberal democracies.
III. The populist challenge: Ideology and discourse
Assessing the populist challenge to GC requires confronting the ‘cliché’ of
populist conceptual fuzziness in public discourse (Panizza 2005: 1). Against
these obstacles, social science of the last decades has solidified around a
minimal consensus which considers populism to be a people-centred form of
anti-elite politics in democracieswhich can be approached through different
analytical lenses (Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017; Aslanidis 2018a; Katsam-
bekis and Kioupkiolis 2019).
In this article, I rely on the ideational approach to populismwhich studies
populist politics as a discourse or set of ideas holding that society is divided
between the people and an elite and that the popular will should prevail in
politics (Hawkins 2009;Mudde 2017; Katsambekis and Kioupkiolis 2019).
Populism, in this view, partly relies on a specific set of ideas to advance its
people-centred anti-elitism, which can be identified and empirically studied
(Aslanidis 2018a; Hawkins et al. 2018). Hence, political actors (e.g. leaders,
parties or movements) simultaneously advancing ideas of people-centrism,
anti-elitism and popular sovereignty in political discourse are defined as
populist (March 2017: 286–8).
This populist discourse qualifies as a particular, ‘thin-centred’ type of
political ideology with limited range compared to more comprehensive sets
of ideas like Liberalism or Socialism (Stanley 2008). By itself, populism does
not offer an encompassing societal analysis with answers to most social
problems: its core content instead is limited to the allegation that democracy
was subverted by a morally corrupted elite, such that popular sovereignty is
now lacking in the practice of representative politics (Hawkins, Read and
Pauwels 2017). To complement this ‘thin’ ideological centre, populist ideas
are advanced in political discourse together with content from so-called
‘host ideologies’, which give the populist core concepts contextual meaning
and define its substantive political programmes (Mudde 2017). As a result,
varieties of populism – understood as the combination of populist discourse
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and host ideology – can come in different flavours depending on the discur-
sive construction undertaken in each case.
This discursive construction forms a key populist avenue to power,
attempting to develop a ‘hegemonic’ vision for society in competition with
established parties (Laclau 2005; Stavrakakis 2017). To that end, populist
discourse strategically puts forward a (‘diagnostic’) narrative defining a
societal crisis, draws on host-ideologies to offer (‘prognostic’) political
answers in opposition to elite views, and constructs a shared people-centred
political identity to mobilise constituencies in favour of political change in
line with its vision (Aslanidis 2018b: 448). Where such populist discourse
‘resonates’ by aligning with citizen attitudes and perceptions of a given
context, it may unfold political power by yielding populist electoral success,
thereby influencing the broader political discourse directly upon entering
office or indirectly as other parties take up elements of populist host-
ideology to stave off the challenge to power (Bonikowski 2017: S191–S194).
On this basis, I analyse the populist challenge as a discursive ‘contesta-
tion’, drawing on a concept of political conflict which refers to the intro-
duction of distinctive ideas through political representatives in a political
arena which is ideologically competing for electoral success (Marks and
Steenbergen, 2002).1 Despite contingencies of contextual resonance and
populist ideologies interacting with institutions and other parties in these
electoral arenas, comparatively analysing the discursive political supply of
populist actors is a necessary step to understand their potential influence on
institutions of GC.Within the discursive struggle for power in democracies,
this article therefore focuses on the ideological challenge to global constitu-
tional norms advanced by emerging populists.
Varieties of populist contestation: Exclusion vs. inclusion and
transnational politicisation
How can populist discursive contestations vary? The seminal distinction is
between ‘exclusionary’ and ‘inclusionary’ types of populism (Mudde and
Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). Both types share the core populist ideology, but
they differ in three related features: (1) how they discursively construct the
populist core and host ideology to give meaning to the concepts of ‘the
people’, ‘the elite’ and the obstacles to popular sovereignty guiding politics;
whether they seek (2) economic and (3) political inclusion of excluded
segments of society or, rather, seek to exclude parts of society from the
economic and political sphere on behalf of a smaller in-group (March 2017;
1 Note that I remain agnostic about the degree of ‘opportunism’ or ‘conviction’ underlying the
populist discourse (see also Aslanidis 2016: 96).
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Stavrakakis, Andreadis and Katsambekis 2017). Put differently, populists
differ according to the discursive construction of core populist ideas and the
host-ideological content of political or economic exclusion and inclusion.2
Discursive exclusion and inclusion ‘essentially alludes to setting the
boundaries of ‘the people’ and, ex negativo, ‘the elite’ (Mudde and Rovira
Kaltwasser 2013: 164, emphasis in original). While all populists vertically
separate a ‘people’ from an ‘elite’, exclusionary and inclusionary populists
take different approaches to horizontally differentiating among the pop-
ulation in order to define ‘the (morally true) people’ and their antagonists
(Ivaldi, Lanzone and Woods 2017; March 2017). Exclusionary populists
advance a discourse of horizontal exclusionwhich restricts ‘the people’ to a
national, ethnic or otherwise defined sub-group of the population, and
casts others as outsiders to this ‘true’ people (De Cleen and Stavrakakis
2017). In contrast, inclusionary populists discursively build a more com-
prehensive popular identity going beyond the existing status quo (Ivaldi,
Lanzone and Woods 2017; Mouffe 2018). Such a discourse advances an
inclusive conception of ‘the people’ independent of their differences, built
on the exercise of collective sovereignty by the marginalised vis-à-vis an
elite with allegedly outsized influence (Aslanidis 2018b; Katsambekis and
Kioupkiolis 2019).
Beyond their discursive core, exclusionary and inclusionary forms of
economic and political host-ideology can be distinguished between popu-
lists. The economic dimension of ideology relates to different solutions to
distributional questions. Hence, economic exclusion and inclusion ‘refer to
the distribution of state resources, both monetary and non-monetary, to
specific groups in society’ (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013: 158).
Economic exclusion refers to reducing the provision of public resources to
some parts of the population, whereas economic inclusion means calling for
an increased use of public funds to support segments of society. Finally, the
political dimension of ideology is a struggle between different visions for
who can legitimately partake in the democratic contest. Political exclusion
and inclusion thus ‘refer essentially to […] political participation and public
contestation. Political exclusion means that specific groups are prevented
from participating (fully) in the democratic system and they are consciously
not represented in the arena of public contestation. In contrast, political
inclusion specifically targets certain groups to increase their participation
and representation’ (ibid 161).
2 Here, I adapt the framework developed by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser
(2013), recasting their ‘symbolic’ dimension of exclusion/inclusion as one of discursive construc-
tion and their ‘material’ dimension as economic.
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Traditionally, populists were seen as neatly categorised into exclusionary
and inclusionary ‘right’ and ‘left’ versions across these dimensions (March
2017). However, because of historical changes in the structure of political
conflict, this may no longer apply. Populist contestation takes place in a
historical context of transnational politicisation, defined as a process where
societies render transnational issues such as immigration, international
integration and economic globalisation objects of public political conflict
(Zürn, Binder and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012; Hutter, Grande and Kriesi 2016).
Due to more salient and polarised contestation on transnational issues and
institutions, a new dimension of political conflict which is orthogonal to the
classic left–right dimension has solidified in recent decades (de Wilde, Leu-
pold and Schmidtke 2016: 4). This ‘transnational’ cleavage consists of a
divide in societal attitudes between ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘communitarian’
ideologies or between economic, political and cultural ‘integration’ and
‘demarcation’ (Kriesi et al. 2012; Hooghe and Marks 2017; De Wilde
et al. 2019). Hence, ‘this divide pits cosmopolitan parties and voters on
both the left and right advocating an inclusionary and international outlook
[…] against [communitarian] parties and voters on both the left and right
that are increasingly wary of open borders and international influences’
(De Vries 2017: 1542).
Transnational politicisation implies that populists can ideologically vary
also on a transnational dimension which explicitly addresses issues and
institutions of GC: the key constitutional questions of who should have
political rights and who can contest to receive which share of economic
resources can then be answered not only nationally (e.g. only white wealthy
men, or also other groups in society?) but also with regard to transnational
inclusion or exclusion (e.g. of refugees, migrants or other countries’ citizens
and representatives).
As a result, four distinct varieties of populism are apparent in such
conditions, with variable views on constitutional frameworks beyond the
state. Both neo-socialist and neoliberal populists on the economic dimension
can exhibit politically exclusionary characteristics pertaining to communi-
tarian host-ideology. In both cases, such populism would seek to reduce
political participation and contestation rights for citizens and residents
beyond the discursively constructed ethno-national sub-group of ‘the peo-
ple’. Where such a contestation can be observed, we can speak of a com-
munitarian type of populism.
Mirroring these versions,more transnationally inclusive types of left and
right populism can also be conceived. As de Cleen argues, international
populism would refer to ‘international cooperation between nationally
organized populist parties andmovements’whereas transnational populism
even ‘constructs a transnational people-as-underdog as a political subject
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that supersedes the boundaries of the nation-state’ (2017: 355).3 Different
degrees of populist transnationalism can thus range from nationalist com-
munitarianism via internationalism to cosmopolitanism. This cosmopolitan
type of populism in favour of political rights beyond the state can again
feature either neo-socialist or neoliberal economic views.
In sum, four ideal-typical varieties of populismmay therefore be identified
in such conditions (see Figure 1). The bottom right quadrant denotes a
purely exclusionary populist challenge that is communitarian and neoliberal
in ideology. This version would be opposed to constitutional frameworks
enshringing political rights beyond the state and in favour of restricting
rights to economic redistribution.Most strongly contrasting this version is a
purely inclusionary populism on the top left, which uses cosmopolitan and
neo-socialist host-ideology. This variety would be in favour of political
rights beyond the state and campaign for rights to political intervention in
the economy. Additionally, mixed forms of populism exist: these can contest
on the one hand on behalf of cosmopolitan and neoliberal ideology, sup-
porting political rights at the global level with restricted rights to politically
interfere in the operation of markets. Finally, on the contrary, populists can
Integration / Cosmopolitanism
Demarcation / Communitarianism
Economic Right / 
Neoliberalism
Economic Left / 
Neo-Socialism
Political Inclusion
&
Economic Inclusion
Political Exclusion
&
Economic Exclusion
Political Exclusion
&
Economic Inclusion
Political Inclusion
&
Economic Exclusion
COSMOPOLITAN
POPULISM
COMMUNITARIAN
POPULISM
Figure 1: Two-dimensional ideological space and types of populist contestation
under conditions of transnational politicisation.
3 As De Cleen notes, ‘the distinction between international and transnational populism is a
matter of degree’ (2017: 356).
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also advocate for economic neo-socialism on the domestic level, while
maintaining communitarian political exclusion transnationally. This vari-
ant would oppose political rights beyond the domestic state but seek to
redistribute economic resources nationally.
IV Transnational varieties of populist contestation
This section empirically illustrates the transnational typology through a
series of exploratory case studies, before analysing contemporary populists’
relationship to principles of GC.On the basis of partymanifestos and leader
discourse of populist actors during the process of electoral emergence, I first
discuss the two versions of communitarian populism, before considering the
two cosmopolitan incarnations.
Communitarianism populism
Communitarian types of populism extend an exclusionary populist contes-
tation to institutions of GC. In this type’s discourse, society is portrayed as
divided into an ethno-national ‘people’whose sovereignty is obstructed by a
morally corrupted elite which serves itself, migrants or foreigners
(Bonikowski 2017). Such populists exclude particular groups or individuals
from the morally legitimate group of ‘the people’ to protect or increase
‘natives” share of political influence and economic resources in a society seen
as zero-sum (Mudde 2007). Populist discourse is thus combined with polit-
ically exclusionary host-ideology to advance either neoliberal or neo-
socialist versions of communitarian populism.
Communitarian neoliberal populism: The ‘Alternative for Germany’
Neoliberal versions of communitarian populism argue that resources should
bewithheld or revoked fromundeserving out-groups at home and abroadby
reducing social welfare support or public money for minorities (de Koster,
Achterberg and van derWaal 2013; Schumacher and vanKersbergen 2016).
Claiming that hard-working ‘native people’ are being exploited, lower taxes
and reduced state interference to the benefit of ‘the people’ is promised,
highlighting the economically neoliberal ideology employed by these pop-
ulists (Kitschelt 1997).
The German Alternative for Germany (AfD) serves as an illustrative case
of neoliberal communitarian populism. Formed in 2013, it broke through
electorally in 2014. Though its hasty first manifesto from September 2013
was very sparse, it already demanded in populist fashion that ‘the people
should determine the will of the parties, not the reverse’, called for ‘strength-
ening of democracy and democratic civil rights’ and for introducing
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‘popular referenda and initiatives’ in particular on transfers of sovereignty
to the EU (AfD 2013: 2). Denigrating an illegitimate political elite, ‘parties’
were claimed to ‘rule over’ the political system while ‘sand is deliberately
thrown in the eyes of citizens’ (AfD 2013: 2–3). The first full manifesto of
2017 elaborated on these popular antagonists, stating that ‘a small, pow-
erful political oligarchy which has developed within existing political
parties’ was the ‘secret sovereign in Germany’ and is responsible for ‘the
negative developments of recent decades’ (AfD 2017: 7). Allegedly, a
‘political class had formed whose primary interest is in its power, its status
and its material welfare’, holding ‘the levers of state power, political
education and informational and medial influence on the population in
its hands’ (ibid).
Beyond established parties, ‘the people’ were painted as exploited by the
allegedly inflation-inducing European Central Bank (ECB), and by ‘banks,
hedge-fonds and private large-scale investors’ as the main benefactors of
government policy (AfD 2013: 1). Similarly, ‘Brussels bureaucracy’ was
blamed as intransparent and ‘detached from citizens’ and the European
Parliament as having ‘failed in the control of Brussels’ (ibid 2). Later, theAfD
expanded under the heading ‘without popular sovereignty, no democracy’
that the ‘untouchable popular sovereignty’ had been interfered with by
European integration without a ‘European people’, a process which alleg-
edly ‘limits or permanently destroys […] democratic nation-states’ andmade
‘German citizens the paymaster of Europe’ (AfD 2017: 6–7).
In opposition to this elite at home and in Europe, ‘the people’ have to
‘return to being sovereign’ according to theAfDand receive ‘the right to look
deputies over the shoulder’, to change or decline ‘the flood of’ parliamentary
laws which are ‘often without sense’ and be empowered to ‘initiate and
confirm’ laws by popular referendum (AfD 2017: 7). Indeed, ‘only the
Staatsvolk [lit. state people] of the Federal Republic of Germany can, via
the tools of immediate democracy, end this illegal state of affairs’ (ibid)
according to the AfD. In ‘contrast to the CDU and its chancellor [Merkel],
we believe the German people to be responsible and able’ to decide ‘fateful
decisions of the nation with more foresight and sense of common good than
power- and interest-guided professional politicians’ (AfD 2017: 8). Beyond
domestic politics, the AfD pronounced that ‘every people should be allowed
to democratically decide about its own currency’, that savings of ‘the citizen’
must not be ‘devoured’ by inflation, and that ‘the tax-payer’ should not bear
Euro bailout costs (AfD 2013: 1).
The exclusionary character of the AfD’s discourse was apparent from the
start. Already the 2013 manifesto decried ‘unordered immigration into our
social security systems’ and a need for ‘qualified migration willed to inte-
grate’ (AfD 2013: 4). This exclusion of ethno-national outsiders was
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expanded in the 2017programme,where it claimed towork onbehalf of ‘big
accomplishments of European civilisation’ brought about by ‘Christian and
humanist culture’ (AfD 2017: 10) and in defence of a ‘German lead culture
instead of multiculturalism’, citing language, customs, traditions, cultural
history and values (AfD, 2017: 46). In separation from it, the AfD stated that
‘Islam does not belong to Germany’ and that ‘its spread and the presence of
more than 5 million Muslims whose number constantly rises’ presents a ‘big
danger for our state, our society and our value system’ (AfD 2017: 33).
Indeed, it proclaimed the threat of ‘further destruction of European values’
throughan ‘alreadyongoing culturefight betweenoccident and Islam [and its]
non-integratable cultural traditions and legal commands’ (AfD 2017: 46).
Further, the programme paints a dark picture of ‘foreigners’ criminality’,
terror and exploitations of the automatic birthright to German citizenship
for instance through ‘members of criminal clans’ (AfD 2017: 22) and ‘mostly
unqualified asylum applicants’ (AfD 2017: 27–8).
Further exclusionary discourse was apparent towards progressive gender
roles and sexual minorities. As such, the AfD campaigned in favour of
‘traditional families’, stated that single parents are ‘not an ideal case’ for
whom special public support should be curtailed, and claimed that ‘gender
ideology marginalises natural differences between sexes and questions sex-
ual identity’, seeking to ‘get rid of the classical family as life model and role
script’ (AfD 2017: 39). ‘So-called quota rules’ for gender-based affirmative
action as well as anti-discrimination laws allegedly intrude on legal equality
and private individuals’ freedom of contract (AfD 2017: 11). It also
denounced initiatives such as the ‘equal pay day’ or gender-sensitive lan-
guage as ‘propaganda activities’ and sexual education in schools as an
‘ideological experiment in early sexualisation’ on behalf of the ‘sexual
leanings of a loud minority’ (AfD 2017: 39–40).
Derived from such exclusionary populist discourse, communitarian host-
ideological responses abound, exemplified by the promise of ‘self-
conservation, not self-destruction of our state and people’ (AfD 2017: 28).
In this vein, the AfD insisted on a ‘re-ordering of immigration law’ (AfD
2013: 4) and an ‘immediate closing’ of borders to ‘immediately end’ the
supposedly ‘unordered mass immigration’ (AfD 2017: 28). Further berating
immigrants, ‘the successful adjustment of all of these people, including a
substantial share of analphabets, is impossible’ according to the AfD,
justifying a need for ‘several years of negative migration’ (ibid). Demanding
‘national sovereignty regarding every formof immigration’, theAfD claimed
that ‘mass abuse of asylum rights must be ended by reforming German basic
law’ and demanded ‘re-negotiating’ the ‘outdated’ Geneva convention ‘and
other supra- and international agreements’ to ‘adjust them to the threat to
Europe from population explosions andmigration streams of the globalised
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present and future’ (AfD 2017: 29). Ending rights to family reunion for
refugees, defining absolute maxima for annual migration and strongly
restricting citizenship rights for migrants and their descendants are further
policy planks justified on communitarian grounds (AfD 2017: 30–1).
Beyond immigration, the AfD also opposed a ‘centralised European state’
and called to ‘return legal competences to national parliaments’ (AfD 2013:
1–2), as well as demanding a popular referendum about German member-
ship in the Euro and ‘potentially in the EU’ (AfD 2017: 7–8). It called for
putting an end to trade and foreign investment inducing ‘the sell-out of
knowledge produced in our country over generations’ as well as to trade
agreements like TTIP which contain supranational courts (AfD 2017: 18–
19). Regarding transnational climate politics, the AfD programme sowed
doubts about the scientific authority of the UN’s IPCC and called for the
termination of the 2015 Paris Climate Accords and a German exit from and
the abolition of all support to ‘all public and private “climate protection’
organisations” (AfD 2017: 64).
Promoting a neoliberal version of communitarianism, suppressing public
spending by respecting the constitutional public ‘debt brake’ and reducing
German ‘mountains of debt’ as well as ‘drastically simplifying the tax code’
is favoured by the AfD (AfD 2013: 2). It later expanded that a ‘reduction of
tax- and social security contribution rates’ and ‘dismantling of bureaucracy’
was its target as well as the reduction of subsidies and ‘unnecessary public
expenses’ (AfD 2017: 49). It also demanded an end to inheritance tax in its
current form and no reintroduction of a wealth tax (ibid 50). Additionally,
all ecological subsidies as part of the German energy transition are to be
‘scrapped without replacement’ while nuclear, gas and coal power plants
should remain on grid to ‘not overburden the economy and citizen’ and
green technologies like electromobility are to develop, ‘like every technol-
ogy, on the basis of market economics’ (AfD 2017: 65).
Beyond domestic politics, the AfD called in neoliberal fashion for reform-
ing the EU to ‘reduce Brussels bureaucracy’ and slim it through ‘more
competition and self-responsibility’ (AfD 2013: 2). It demanded quitting
the alleged ‘transfer union’ and dismantling or leaving the Euro area as well
as preventing any potential risk-sharing for non-German banks and deposits
and any further ‘arbitrary’ bailout programmes (AfD 2017: 7–8). Similarly,
it aims at forbidding the ECB from intervening in financial markets by
buying public ‘junk bonds’ and ‘expropriating savers and pensioners’
through active monetary policy (AfD 2013: 1, 2017: 13–14).
In sum, the AfD clearly illustrates a communitarian and neoliberal type of
populist contestation. Its discourse divides society between an elite of estab-
lished parties, progressive gender ideologues and Eurocrats on the one hand,
and the upright German ‘people’ of tax-paying citizens whose sovereignty is
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allegedly thwarted on the other. It defined ‘the people’ exclusively in tradi-
tional ethno-cultural terms, portraying migrants, refugees, Islam, sexual
minorities and women beyond traditional gender roles as outsiders which
encroach on the ‘popular’ will. Advancing a communitarian vision of
national sovereignty, it opposed immigration, any further EU integration
and concessions to global climate politics. In line with neoliberal convic-
tions, it demanded downsizing the German tax state, preventing any finan-
cial risk-sharing in Europe as well as public fiscal and monetary policy
actively intervening in markets.
Communitarian neo-socialist populism: The ‘Law and Justice Party’
A second version of communitarian populism emphasises an alleged ethno-
popular oppression through an allegedly privileged and ‘do-gooder’ elite
which seeks to please international markets and financially support
migrants and foreigners, denying the ‘common man’ its fair economic share
of societal resources (Shields 2012). The construction of the ‘elite’ takes a
more capitalist turn in this variety, demonising financial market links and
‘global capital’ (Kalb 2018).4 In turn, the construction of ‘the people’ ismore
class-based in this kind of populism, while retaining the focus on an ethno-
culturally demarcated subset of economically lower classes (Gidron and
Hall 2017). Ideologically, it thus combines political communitarianismwith
neo-socialist economic views.
As a case of this version of populism, the Polish Lawand Justice Party (PiS)
is illustrative. Having turned towards populist discourse ahead of the 2005
elections, PiS went on to govern in a coalition with the agrarian ‘Self-
Defence’ and the religiously conservative ‘League of Polish Families’
(LPF). Taking up economically inclusionary discourse from the originally
left-wing Self-Defence and outbidding the LPF on cultural conservatism, it
eventually forced both coalition partners out of the Polish political system
altogether. While this contributed to the party losing its governing majority
in the (early) 2007 elections, a strengthened PiS won an outright majority in
the 2015 elections, governing the country since (Stanley 2018).
Combining inclusionary and exclusionary populist discourse, PiS devel-
oped a radical critique of ‘the political decisions of the elites at the time’
which were ‘choosing the wrong path of transformation after the 1989
system change’, leading to ‘beneficiaries under such capitalist conditions
[having] become undeservedly privileged’ (PiS 2005: 7). The ‘old state and
4 Of course, sometimes this discourse relies on outright anti-semitic tropes, such as in the
booming conspiracy theories about investment fund manager and progressive philanthropist
George Soros, who is of Jewish Hungarian heritage. He is demonised in far-right circles globally
and especially by Hungary’s populist president Viktor Órban.
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informal apparatus’ originating from Communist-era ‘influences and secret
links to the Special Services’ allegedly operated through ‘informal and often
interpenetrating cliques and interest groups including powerful pressure
groups [such as] the banking and import lobby’ (ibid). Decrying a ‘lack of
resistance to corruption and particularistic and premeditated group inter-
ests’ (ibid) as ‘one of the most serious diseases affecting the Third Polish
Republic’ (ibid 18), it branded those elites for tolerating escalating regional
and social inequality resulting from neoliberal ‘shock therapy’ in the 1990s
and for sacrificing the rural population and catholic values. Decrying an
alleged moral ‘crisis of polonism and patriotism’, a ‘crisis of values con-
nected with the sense of national belonging’ (PiS 2005: 10), it further
stigmatised liberal urbanites and called out the post-1989 ruling parties as
‘definitely anti-family’, alleging they ‘put in place rules that actually encour-
age young people to premature sexual intercourse’ and started to ‘work on a
law legalising homosexual marriage, without excluding the possibility of
adopting children in such relationships in the future’ (PiS 2005: 118).
In contrast to post-Soviet elites, PiS claimed to campaign on behalf of the
marginalised ‘vast majority of Poles’who ‘had to bear the costs of transfor-
mation’ (PiS 2005: 8), placing itself discursively with ‘ordinary Poles’ (PiS
2005: 12). In communitarian fashion, PiS promised that ‘words like home-
land, Poland, Poles, neighbours, human dignity are not just empty sounds
for most of us’ and that they believe ‘in a revival of a sense of community
and a spirit of solidarity and a social and Christian neighbourly love’ (PiS
2005: 13).
Laying out its exclusionary view of ‘the people’, PiS campaigned on behalf
of traditional, patriarchal and hierarchic social values seen as central to
‘national culture [as] the source of national identity transmitted from gen-
eration to generation’ (PiS 2005: 105), while excluding female participation
and contestation, rights of homosexuals, as well as those of ethnic and
religious minorities. Accordingly, ‘PiS, seeing in Christian values that form
the basis of […] our cultural sphere the foundation of a strong family, is
against abortion and euthanasia’ and in favour of ‘state-run family-oriented
policies […], strengthening desirable patterns of family life and ethics’, while
warning of certain ‘pathological phenomena in families’ (PiS 2005: 81) and
‘social pathologies’ seen as also caused by ‘modern cultural trends’ (ibid
124). Overall, PiS demanded ‘resolute responses by public authorities to
manifestations of violation of the moral order’ (ibid), including a ‘law on
protection of the citizens’ peace, introducing severe and prompt enforce-
ment of penalties for anti-social behaviour, […] such as violating the peace
and infringements of order, silence, morality, etc.’ (PiS 2005: 29).
This discursive exclusion reverberates in its communitarian ideology.
According to PiS, it was necessary to oppose ‘attempts to impose the
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supremacy of European Law on national institutions as well as the lack of
consent to the issues of morals and moral laws which are regulated by
European law and not left in full responsibility of the Member States (ibid
43). The process of EU identity-building was seen as in practice ‘imposing
the identity of the stronger nations on the weaker nations’ (ibid 9). On such
communitarian grounds, PiS opposed the draft Constitution for Europe for
‘giving too many new competences’ to EU institutions and ‘lowering the
rank of the [Polish] Constitution’ (ibid 42). Specifically, the EU constitution
was allegedly ‘denying the role of Christianity in moral and cultural forma-
tion of our continent’, introducing ‘a kind of anti-Christian censorship’ and
showing that ‘the Union has departed from the values that guided the
European founding fathers’ and is ‘experiencing a crisis of cultural identity’
(ibid). Quoting pope John Paul, PiS alleged that such a ‘democracy without
values easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism’ (ibid).
Poland, instead, should take its place in the EU to ‘revive Europe with the
spirit of Christian solidarity, expressed in human rights, the rights of the
family and the rights of nations’ (ibid).
Regarding European institutions, PiS further declared itself ‘afraid of the
Union's domination by the strongest, most populous and economicallymost
powerful states’ (PiS 2007: 27) and ‘in favour of strengthening the role of
[the Polish parliament]’ to face ‘the threat of creating rights outside [its]
control, which is contrary to the fundamental principle in the constitution
namely the sovereignty of the Polish nation’ (PiS 2005: 46). Accordingly, it
was ‘opposed to replacing sovereign states and creating a European super-
state structure’ (ibid 44), as well as to ‘imposing the common currency on
Poland until the costs of monetary union will be definitely lower than the
possible benefits’ (ibid 63). Generally, according to PiS, ‘all EU competences
arise from sovereign decisions of countries’, such that its overall EU vision
was that ‘the most important decision-making institutions […] should
remain the European Council and Council of the EU’ while ‘maintaining
the unanimity rules’ on treaty change, thereby ‘preserving independence of
Polish economic policy within the commonmarket’ and ‘confirming the role
of national governments and national parliaments’ to bring the EU ‘closer to
the average citizen’ (PiS 2005: 43–4).
Economically, the PiS brand of populism calls for amore socially sensitive
and less market-dominated type of capitalism. In contrast to post-1989
governments who are decried as having ‘significantly reduced taxes and
social security contributions’, key tenets of their programme became
‘increasing social benefit payments, […] raising the minimumwage, increas-
ing expenditures on child nutrition and benefits to worse-off families’ (PiS
2007: 1). Increasing investments in infrastructure, expanding the public
health and education system as well as ensuring ‘development through
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employment’ (PiS 2005: 12) were proposed as necessary, arguing that in a
modern market economy, ‘we cannot deprive the state of influence and
responsibility for the social order, in particular for theweakest social groups
whose situation as a result of the transformation has been rapidly deterio-
rating’ (ibid: 113–14). Blaming austere fiscal policy pursued by the previous
governments in their goal of acceding the Eurozone for requiring ‘further
sacrifices [from citizens] to tighten the belt’, such that ‘everyone paid for it in
their own way’, PiS promised instead to actively address the ‘embarrassing
[…] disgrace’ of unemployment, deprivation and poverty (ibid 8). Further,
PiS opposed the Euro and full international market liberalisation because of
‘too strong competitive pressure’without ‘preparing companies for compe-
tition on global markets [so that] it will not weaken the competitiveness of
Polish exports’ (PiS 2005: 63).
In sum, PiS illustrates the communitarian and neo-socialist type of pop-
ulist contestation well. Relying on an exclusionary discourse elevating
‘ordinary Poles’ defined according to traditional Christian values, it demo-
nised the ruling liberal post-1989 elite for their openness to liberal causes
such as rights of homosexuals and for tolerating the inequality produced by
neoliberal market integration in the 1990s. In response, PiS advocates a
more communitarian and neo-socialist Polish ideology, defending national
‘popular’ sovereignty over Catholic values and protectionist, redistributive
economic policy.
Cosmopolitan populism
In contrast, cosmopolitan populism extends an inclusionary populist con-
testation to institutions of GC. This type relies on a discourse of popular
integration beyond the nation state against corrupted elites portrayed as
serving particularistic domestic interests (De Cleen 2017; Ingram 2017).
Ideologically, it thus exhibits a cosmopolitan host-ideology which can be
used to advance either neo-socialist or neoliberal economic agendas.
Cosmopolitan neo-socialist populism: DiEM25
Neo-socialist cosmopolitan populism associates international and transna-
tional economic and political elites with maintaining an undemocratic
global order from which they allegedly benefit at the expense of ‘ordinary
people’ (Moffitt 2017). In opposition to this elite, ‘the people’ are con-
structed as sharing a united identity across national borders and citizenship
limits by jointly being exploited economically and oppressed politically
(Ingram2017).Given this transnational problem constellation, neo-socialist
cosmopolitan populists emphasise more majoritarian decision-making in
political institutions beyond the nation state to redress perceived
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undemocratic tendencies in IOs and to change the economically neoliberal
character of international constitutional order.
At the level of political parties, this type of populism is rare given the
dearth of transnational democratic electoral arenas. However, the recently
formed Democracy in Europe Movement (DiEM25) can serve as an illus-
trative case. Founded as a ‘pan-European platform’ in 2015 by Yanis
Varoufakis, formerly SYRIZA’s Finance Minister for Greece, it has since
evolved into a transnational party which contested the EP elections in May
2019 andwon its first parliamentary seats in theGreek election of July 2019.
Its populist discourse is evident in its founding manifesto: the ‘Powers of
Europe’ consisting of ‘unaccountable “technocrats”, complicit politicians
and shadowy institutions’ are decried as allegedly seeking ‘to deny, exorcise
and suppress, […] co-opt, evade, corrupt, mystify, usurp and manipulate
democracy’ (DIEM25 2015: 2, 7). In a long list, the opposed ‘deep estab-
lishment whose failed policies lead it to authoritarianism’ is explicitly
specified as amongst others ‘the Brussels Bureaucracy (and its more than
10,000 lobbyists)’ and ‘the Troika they formed together with unelected
technocrats from other International and European Institutions’, ‘bailed
out bankers, fund managers […], political parties [which] betray their most
basic principles when in government’, as well as ‘media moguls who have
turned fear mongering into an art form, and a magnificent source of power
and credit’ (DIEM25 2017: 4). Indeed, according to DiEM25, ‘a confeder-
acy of myopic politicians, economically naïve officials and financially
incompetent experts submit slavishly to the edicts of financial and industrial
conglomerates, alienating Europeans’ from the ‘Brussels democracy-free
zone’ (DIEM25 2015: 2–3).
In opposition to this elite declared as morally corrupt for ‘asphyxiating
democracy’, its discourse pits the European ‘peoples’ (ibid 4–5) with ‘a duty
to regain control over our Europe’ (ibid 7). The main self-declared goal is ‘a
democratic Europe in which all political authority stems from Europe’s
sovereign peoples’, proclaiming that ‘We are forming DiEM25 intent on
moving from a Europe of “We the Governments”, and “We the Techno-
crats”, to a Europe of “We, the peoples of Europe”’ (ibid 7–8). In inclu-
sionary fashion, the movement-party claims to ‘come from every part of the
continent and [be] united by different cultures, languages, accents, political
party affiliations, ideologies, skin colours, gender identities, faiths and
conceptions of the good society’ (ibid) and to seek advancing a ‘pluralist
Europe of regions, ethnicities, faiths, nations, languages and cultures’ aswell
as an ‘Egalitarian Europe that celebrates difference and ends discrimination
based on gender, skin colour, social class or sexual orientation’ (ibid 8).
In response, a politically and economically inclusionary host-ideology is
advanced. Politically, the movement-party proclaimed itself ‘committed to’
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building ‘a real democracy […] at a transnational European level’ (DIEM25
2017: 8). To that end, it wants to ‘promote a Constitutional Assembly
Process, involving representatives elected on transnational tickets, to man-
age the evolution of Europe into a democratic political entity and the
replacement of all existing European Treaties with a democratic European
Constitution’ (DIEM25 2017: 9). Relatedly, already its candidacy at the
recent EP and Greek elections expanded political inclusion beyond national
borders: while transnational lists were not officially allowed, DiEM25
‘simulated’ such lists by agreeing on a common programme beforehand
while running with national organisational and legal structures campaign-
ing on behalf of it. DiEM25’s electoral alliance also sought to ‘strengthen the
European Parliament’ for instance through right of initiative, expand direct-
democratic instruments such as the European Citizen’s initiative and bolster
‘fundamental rights against member-state governments who try to take
them away’ by introducing a watchdog commission investigating on behalf
of the ECJ (European Spring 2019: 7–8). Further cosmopolitan political
demands include a commitment to advance global climate policy commit-
ments under its ‘Green New Deal’ as well as respect for human rights of
migrants and refugees, expansion of legal migration and a common
European Asylum Policy (European Spring 2019: 6–11).
Clearly neo-socialist in economic ideology, DiEM25’s policy programme
decries ‘the bitter price of austerity’, ‘ultra-low investment’ and ‘involuntary
underemployment’ as central economic problems facing Europe (DIEM25
2017: 4). In response, its economic policy platform includes ‘re-politicising
money creation’ and ‘funding a green investment-led recovery’ via central
banks, public investment banks and new carbon-, finance- andwealth taxes,
advancing a ‘Jobs Guarantee program’ as well as partly socialising returns
on assets and technology-driven productivity gains of companies in the
digital era (ibid: 10–11). Combining political and economic inclusion,
DiEM25 advocates in favour of additional international institutions tasked
with economic stabilisation and investment financed from a common,
democratically legitimated budget as well as for ‘democratising’ techno-
cratic institutions such as the ECB and the European Stability Mechanism
(European Spring, 2019: 18–20).
In sum, DiEM25 constitutes an illustrative case of cosmopolitan neo-
socialist populism. Discursively opposing Brussels technocrats and national
governments seen as complicit with global neoliberal market forces, it
campaigns on behalf of a transnational and pluralist vision of the
‘European peoples’ united in their exploitation and disenfranchisement.
Accordingly, it advocated drastic expansions of democratic decision-
making at the international level and large-scale public intervention in the
economy to redress global neoliberalism’s perceived ills.
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Cosmopolitan neoliberal populism: Alberto Fujimori
Finally, neoliberal versions of cosmopolitan populism discursively construct
political elites as systematically in bedwith special clientelistic interests from
the organised working class, state-led enterprises and the broader taxpayer-
money-hungry public bureaucracy (Sawer and Laycock 2009). In opposi-
tion to this privileged and corrupted political class, such populism claims to
represent a marginalised and disadvantaged class of ‘ordinary’ people with-
out such connections (Roberts 1995). Ideologically, political participation
and contestation in the market-society should be increased in cosmopolitan
fashion for entrepreneurial citizens and transnational actors alike, be it by
strengthening international investor rights or allowing migrant labour
(Verbeek and Zaslove 2017: 394–6). Economically, the focus is on protecting
‘the people’s’ individual resources from alleged state capture and redistribution
to the privileged, as the state’s role in the economy is made responsible for
individuals’ ills such as inflation, inefficiencies and cyclical crisis. Accordingly,
thedistorting state shouldbe shrunk, taxes loweredand themarket unleashedas
the ‘legitimate instrument of the popular will’ (Sawer and Laycock 2009: 134).
This type of politically inclusive but economically exclusive populism is
rare in established liberal democracies and does not form part of the
contemporary wave of populist challenges to GC. However, it can be
illustrated with recourse to examples in 1990s Latin America. There, the
second wave of neo-populist politics brought to power politicians like
Alberto Fujimori in Peru, whose contestation is discussed in the Annex as
an illustrative historical case (Roberts 1995; Weyland 1996).
V. Contemporary varieties of populism and the challenges to global
constitutionalism
How do varieties of populism discursively challenge global constitutional
principles? To address this question, I first focus on the contemporary
versions of communitarian and cosmopolitan populism, before discussing
pertinent cases with key ideological ambiguities in their contestations.
Communitarian populism: Contesting (neo-)liberal global
constitutionalism
Communitarian populists like the German AfD or the Polish PiS advance a
populist discourse by excluding those groups constructed as outsiders to the
‘ethno-national people’ from having equal rights to those of the populist
in-group (Jenne 2018). The concerns of minorities, refugees, migrants, as
well as citizens of other states and their representatives are not considered as
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equally legitimate and as standing in the way of following the ethno-
nationalist ‘people’s’ interests in politics. Through their discourse, commu-
nitarian populism thus contests liberal democratic legitimacy by questioning
constitutional protections of individual and minority rights, claiming that
they undermine ethno-national popular sovereignty (Rummens 2017).
For GC, this version of populism therefore presents an illiberal challenge
to international human rights and to rules-based multilateralism. Due to its
zero-sum view of society, it seeks to reduce political rights of constructed
‘outsiders’ and undermine international legal institutions in their way. For
instance, the AfD called to renegotiate the Geneva convention on interna-
tional rights of refugees and asylum-seekers, wishing to privilege national
sovereignty over immigration. Similarly, PiS opposed the European consti-
tutional framework for not clearly privileging its interpretation of Christian
cultural traditions and imposing pluralist values through legal supremacy
beyond the state.
Two different versions of such communitarian populism became appar-
ent: a neoliberal onewhich calls for economic exclusion from state resources
domestically, too, and a neo-socialist one, which advocates for economic
redistribution among its restricted, ethno-nationalist sub-group of ‘the
people’.
Neoliberal communitarian challenges like the AfD’s do not as clearly
oppose economic principles in global constitutional institutions where sim-
ilar principles historically dominate. Rather, its challenge opposes the
European constitutional framework on the basis of allegedly threatening
to privilege Southern European and refugees’ rights ahead of ‘native’ Ger-
man taxpayers’, desperately calling for respect of the neoliberal ‘no-bailout’
principle in the EU treaties. In communitarian fashion, a return to national
fiscal, monetary and immigration policy is demanded to reclaim this vision
of neoliberal economic policy, as (existing) global constitutional limitations
on economic transfers are not trusted.
In contrast, as an example of neo-socialist communitarianism, PiS addi-
tionally challenges neoliberal economic principles of GC. The EU and
Eurozone accession criteria imposing fiscal austerity are criticised as harmful
to Poland and as unjustly limiting the capacities for social policy expendi-
tures towards left-behind rural and unemployed parts of the population.
Similarly, the strategic strengthening of domestic industry against European
and global market competition runs counter to WTO and EU free market
principles on trade. In addition to its illiberal communitarian challenge, PiS’
version of populism thus contests the legitimacy of neoliberal economic
principles beyond the state binding domestic majority politics.
Beyond these cases, the nativist form of communitarianism exhibited by
both AfD and PiS is associated with the contemporary populist radical right
Varieties of populism and the challenges to Global Constitutionalism 23
(Bonikowski 2017). Examples range from neoliberal populist examples like
the Spanish party ‘Vox’ via mixed cases of protectionism and deregulation
like Donald Trump’s Republican party to neo-socialist projects like the
French Rassemblement National under Marine Le Pen. While their eco-
nomic views vary, this party family thus shares an illiberal and nationalist
challenge to the global liberal principles of human rights and rule of
international law.
Cosmopolitan populism: Contesting in support of liberal-democratic
global constitutionalism
Cosmopolitan populists like DiEM25 advance an inclusionary populist
discourse by complementing their anti-elitism with an emphasis on a trans-
national notion of ‘the people’. In contrast to communitarians, they do not
seek to reduce political rights of a sub-group of the population. Rather, they
call to expand individual rights transnationally and support more rules-
based multilateralism in their discourse. For instance, DiEM25 called for
expanding rights of migrants and refugees and bolstering EU citizens’
fundamental rights as well as for additional European institutions. Fujimori
emphasised indigenous and gender equality rights as well as international
investor rights (see Annex).
However, such cosmopolitan populism contests in favour of a distinct
normative vision of GC. Historically, neoliberal cosmopolitans like Fuji-
mori sought to enshrine onlymarket principles and individual rights beyond
the state (see Annex). In contrary, contemporary neo-socialist versions like
DiEM25 favour binding politics through democratic rules of popular sov-
ereignty at the international level and accordingly call for expansions of
transnational democratic rights, too. For instance, DiEM25 called for
strengthening citizen initiatives at the EU level, for giving legislative initiative
rights to the EP and for democratic control over the technocratic ECB and
the intergovernmental ESM. In its calls for further constitutionalising global
politics, this contemporary version of cosmopolitan populism thus empha-
sises the majoritarian pillar of (transnational) popular sovereignty, but also
the liberal political rights needed to exercise that sovereignty.
As such, neo-socialist cosmopolitan populism à la DiEM25 poses a
cosmopolitan challenge on behalf of liberal democratisation as well as
economic neo-socialism. A perceived neoliberal bent in normative economic
principles ofGC is seen by such populists as responsible for the corruption of
democratic politics and unsatisfying economic outcomes in practice, not
unlike the discourse voiced by their communitarian neo-socialist counter-
parts. Yet, in contrast to these, the political ideology they advance in
response is drastically different, based on their transnational notion of
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‘the people’. Accordingly, neo-socialist cosmopolitan populism challenges
the democratic pillar of GC as being underdeveloped and incapable of
reining in global markets which are seen to cause unequal material and
political outcomes to which they are not democratically entitled. In
response, cosmopolitan neo-socialist populists call to strengthen democratic
principles beyond the state to bind politics.
This type of populism is rare given the complexities of constructing a
transnational political identity and the dearth of transnational electoral
arenas in global politics (Moffitt 2017). However, outside the sphere of
parties, transatlantic social movements such as Occupy and the Southern
European anti-austerity Indignados employed a cosmopolitan and neo-
socialist populism in opposition to neoliberal financial globalisation and
Eurozone economic policy (Gerbaudo 2017; Aslanidis 2018b).
Similarly, populist projects have used neo-socialist cosmopolitan dis-
course in other historical contexts. For instance, the initial challenge of
Hugo Chávez in 1990s-Venezuela employed a transnational notion of a
Bolivarian ‘people’ in LatinAmerica, jointly opposed to perceived neoliberal
US imperialism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). In response, his
project advanced a regionalist agenda establishing alternative institutions
of international integration to establish neo-socialist constitutional princi-
ples beyond the state (Kellogg 2007; Verbeek and Zaslove 2017).
Overall, thus, while cosmopolitan populism has historically also existed
in versions supporting (neo-)liberal political principles beyond the state
(seeAnnex), its contemporary challenge toGC is directed specifically against
a perceived neoliberal bent in global normative principles and the dearth of
democratic decision-making enshrined beyond the state.
Transnationally ambiguous populism: Neo-socialist contestations
between global neoliberalism and national democratic politics?
Aside from highlighting contrasting versions of communitarian and cosmo-
politan populist contestation, the typology also allows identifying important
cases of populism which evince clear categorisation because they present
transnationally ambiguous challenges to GC.
Most notably in contemporary politics, several pertinent populists from
the traditional left remain ambivalent towards transnational dimensions of
global politics and constitutional principles beyond the state.5 For instance,
while cosmopolitan populist movements informed the party-political
5 However, historically, transnational ambiguity historically also featured outside of the
populist left. For instance, Silvio Berlusconi’s populist challenge in 1990s Italy exemplifies a
partly cosmopolitan neo-liberal contestation oscillating between economic globalism and anti-
immigration views (see Annex).
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challenges of Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren in the US, SYRIZA in
Greece and Podemos in Spain, these populists advance inclusionary contes-
tations which oppose mainly ‘the 1 percent’ and domestic ‘establishment’
politicians corrupted by them (‘the casta’ in Southern Europe) to a diverse
body of ‘people’ as exploited workers and disenfranchised citizens.
Ideologically, these populists challenge neoliberal principles of GC with-
out offering explicitly cosmopolitan responses. Rather, their contestation
focuses on domestic political institutions and partly uses communitarian
rhetoric vis-à-vis global issues (Halikiopoulou, Nanou and Vasilopoulou
2012). The campaigns of SYRIZA and Podemos, for instance, emphasised
domestic opposition to principles underlying Eurozone institutions and the
Troika bailout programmes, without providing a cosmopolitan contesta-
tion of transnational reform if such resistance fails (Stavrakakis and Kat-
sambekis 2014; Kioupkiolis 2016). Indeed, in the case of SYRIZA,
acquiescing to the Troika demands despite the July 2015 referendum results
directly led to Varoufakis leaving the party and forming DiEM25 as a more
cosmopolitan populist alternative.
More generally, left populists like the Dutch Socialist Party and the
German Left Party remain torn between an internationalist outlook in
principle and sometimes fundamental opposition to global constitutional
projects like the EU in practice for their perceived neo-liberal character (see
Beaudonnet and Gomez 2017: 5–6). Similarly, Jeremy Corbyn’s populist
Labour party leadership essentially fudged its position on Brexit since the
2016 referendum because of divisions between segments of the membership
and electorate, officially announcing a partial ‘Remain’ position only three
years later (Labour Party 2019).
Overall, such cases of transnationally ambiguous populism on the left
appear to be caught between two contending impulses: on the one hand, they
share the criticism of global neoliberalism and its democratic effects
advanced by its cosmopolitan neo-socialist counterparts.On the other hand,
they focus on restoring popular sovereignty in national democratic politics
instead of transnational arenas and advance a socially protectionist chal-
lenge towards international institutions and their perceived neoliberal bias
rather than explicitly campaigning for their democratisation.
VI. Discussion and implications
The variety of contemporary populist challenges suggest broader implica-
tions for GC. First, populism challenges contemporary GC from three
distinct normative angles, which illustrate the contours of an emerging
discursive contest over GC’s democratic legitimacy. Second, populist
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contestation therefore politicises the process of constitutionalisation beyond
the state, with ambivalent and politically contingent institutional trajecto-
ries for GC.
Contemporary varieties of populism and the discursive contest over
global constitutionalism
While contemporary populist discursive contestations all challenge global
non-majoritarianism, the analysis showed that they relate to principles of
GC in ambivalent ways which depend on their host-ideological variety.
Specifically, three contemporary populist challenges became apparent: a
communitarian one, a cosmopolitan one and a neo-socialist one.
On the one hand, communitarian populists advocate an illiberal and
nationalist vision of majoritarian rule on behalf of their exclusive notion
of national popular sovereignty. These versions attack GC’s liberal pillar of
individual rights and legal institutions guarding these. As such, communi-
tarian populists clearly threaten global de-constitutionalisation in a way
which undermines liberal and democratic principles. For instance, US pres-
ident Trump pulled out of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council
over its criticism of his dehumanising immigration policy and blocked the
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body to conduct bilateral
trade negotiations and impose tariffs outside the constitutional framework
protecting weaker states from strong-arm tactics. Similarly, the Hungarian
and Polish populist governments undermined human rights norms in the
context of the migration crisis and legal independence as guarded by the EU
treaties, illustrating this illiberal nationalist trajectory.6
In contrast, contemporary cosmopolitan populists mount a neo-socialist
challenge on behalf of transnational popular sovereignty, against GC they
perceive as undemocratically (neo-)liberal. These versions support princi-
ples of GC but favour binding global politics through liberal and democratic
principles of popular sovereignty, discursively outlining a trajectory of
global constitutional democratisation. Most prominently, such a trajectory
is currently thinkable in the EU, which for all its democratic discontents
remains globally unrivalled in terms of opportunities for majoritarian influ-
ence. There, cosmopolitan democratisation attempts to transnationalise EP
elections exist by common platforms, candidates and electoral lists of new
6 This de-constitutionalisation challenge may also take less drastic forms, as exemplified by
the more hesitant British Brexit decision instigated by the populist UK Independence Party and
carried out by theConservative Party. To date, English politicians have not yet decidedwhether to
sacrifice free movement rights at the cost of losing access to the singlemarket as well as whether to
respect Irish democratic sovereignty as guarded by the EU at the expense of accepting the so-called
‘backstop’.
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types of populist parties like DiEM25, but also by the non-populist
pan-European party ‘Volt’. Similarly, Green parties have long advocated
for democratic cosmopolitan reform and their electoral surge may
strengthen such a trajectory.
Finally, neo-socialist populists which are divided between communitarian
or cosmopolitan versions promote a more socially sensitive economic con-
stitutional order for the marginalised ‘people’ they claim to represent.While
sharing the contestation of global neoliberal constitutionalisation, especially
populists of the traditional ‘left’ remain ambiguous regarding transnational
issues and institutions and only selectively support global constitutional
principles of international rights and rules-based multilateralism.
In interpreting these findings, some points merit further discussion. First,
populist ideology (like any other) may change over time. For instance,
Marine Le Pen’s leadership has altered the French Front National’s (now
renamed Rassemblement National) formerly neoliberal economic position
towards a neo-socialist stance. Similarly, neo-socialist populists may also
take on more exclusionary ideology. In the case of the populist German Left
Party, the leadership was seen as flirting with a welfare chauvinistic, polit-
ically exclusionary turn in recent years by criticising immigration. Con-
trarily, further transnationalisation of left populists in support of
cosmopolitan democratisation is possible, too: for instance, looser and less
radically pan-European leftist platforms comprising the populists of France
Insoumise and Spain’s Podemos were recently formed ahead of the 2019 EP
elections (Mélenchon 2018).7 Given the authoritarian potential of commu-
nitarian forms of populism for GC and the potentially democratising poten-
tial of transnationally inclusionary populism, these dynamics of discursive
change remain crucial avenues for further research.
Second, the analysis also spurs the question whether ambiguous cases are
currently stuck between conflicting views or, rather, deliberately choose to
ignore a key political conflict in societies marked by transnational issues and
institutions. It is not always clear whether this ambiguity is a beneficial
strategy keeping together precarious electoral alliances, or whether it erodes
their capacity of acting as a credible political force offering answers on
important contemporary questions. As communitarian populists partly
compete with the left in offering economically left-wing positions, the
transnational political cleavage may become the site where progressive
visions, populist or otherwise, are set apart from regressive ones which trade
7 Beyond the European context, only limited attempts at transnationalising populism are
apparent. For instance, Bernie Sanders recently campaigned with DiEM25 on behalf of a
‘progressive international’, jointly demanding neo-socialist and democratising reforms to inter-
national institutions and a ‘Green New Deal’ (DIEM25 and The Sanders Institute 2019).
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off others’ political rights for ‘community’ gain. Not decisively articulating
alternative visions may normalise communitarian populist constructions of
legitimate ethno-popular opposition to allegedly lofty and privileged cos-
mopolitan ideas, thereby devaluing international principles like human
rights.
Finally, as clarified from the outset, identifying distinct populist discursive
challenges can only be a first step providing a basis to analyse their eventual
institutional impacts onGC in different settings.While the specific discursive
construction of populist ideology is expected to shape how they contribute
to institutional change, their influence in discursive contests depends on their
electoral resonance, on the reactions of other political parties, as well as on
domestic and international institutional contexts in any given case. Relat-
edly, this analysis focused on the global dimension of their discursive
challenge in opposition and as such did not consider the interplay between
domestic and international dimensions of constitutional principles or the
normative implications of populist rule. These extensions and empirical
repercussions in different institutional contexts are important avenues for
further research.
Notwithstanding, the three identified contemporary populist challenges
clarify the contours of an emerging discursive contest over the trajectories of
global constitutionalisation. Each version claims to identify a perceived lack
of popular sovereignty in liberal GC for different reasons and advocates
distinctive visions for amore democratically legitimate global constitutional
settlement in response. Taken together, the various populist challenges
therefore describe a contest opposing a global constitutional status quo
perceived as undemocratically (neo-)liberal with normative visions of either
more illiberal democracy or more democratic liberalism. Independent of the
relative normative merits of each type of contestation, it seems undeniable
that the identified challenges target the (neo-)liberal normative principles
which dominate in contemporaryGC and expose its non-majoritarian weak
spot.8
Populist contestation and the process of global constitutionalisation
More generally, the emergence of populism affects the process of global
constitutionalisation. Populist contestation contributes to a societal process
of politicising GC, with ambivalent potential consequences. In contrast to
functional accounts of global constitutionalisation, it has the capacity to
8 As in the domestic context, populist transnational varieties thus seem to respond to the
historical context of international ‘elite’ discourse against which their people-centred political
projects operate (see also Annex).
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impact GC primarily through the domestic democratic system and its
transnational extensions.
In functional readings, constitutionalisation beyond the state is a prag-
matic reaction to the globalisation and fragmentation of international law.
In these accounts, the international legal and political system drives pro-
cesses enshrining fundamental norms, in at least threeways: directly through
IO’s secondary legislation, or indirectly by erecting constraints on conflict-
ing constitutional norms through ordinary international law or by harmo-
nising domestic constitutional law with international law (Dunoff and
Trachtman 2009: 10–18).
In contrast, populist contestation brings societal focus toward the nor-
mative extent and content of GC by shifting electorates’ attention to the
democratic legitimacy of global political and constitutional decision-
making. Indeed, international authority without corresponding democratic
control is a key ideological target for all populists analysed here, though
their host-ideologies lead them to support different majoritarian responses.
Through their discourse, populist contestation therefore opens a discursive
struggle about whether and how international constitutions should norma-
tively regulate political processes as well as how and why societies can
legitimately change global constitutional frameworks and the political
choices derived from them.
Three implications emerge from this finding: first, if populist contestation
is part of a process of politicisation, it may constitute evidence for the
solidified quality and reach of constitutionalisation beyond the state (Lang
andWiener 2017). The populist contestation of democratic legitimacy does
not stop at national borders, as normative principles underlying politics
have increasingly global origins. In this regard, the analysis also provides
evidence for a long-awaited politicisation of international authority accord-
ing to democratic legitimacy criteria (e.g. Zürn 2004). Through populist
contestation, IOs indeed become interwoven in a delegitimation discourse
criticising their non-majoritarian design based on conceptions of democratic
legitimacy.
Second, in consequence of these contestations, domestic politics is driving
processes of global constitutionalisation more than before, with less pre-
dictable outcomes. Politicisation may influence decision-making and global
institutional outcomes, but it is conditional on vote choices and the political
supply-side of party systems including mainstream parties, political oppor-
tunity structures and institutional fora of political decision-making (Kriesi
2012). Even when in power, the preferences of voters, behaviour of main-
stream parties and reactions of domestic and international institutions
remain key factors with the potential to stop or alter the direction and
magnitude of any impact populist ideologymay have (seeRoviraKaltwasser
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and Taggart 2016). Institutional outcomes of GC may thus be more differ-
entiated than in functional processes driven through themore homogeneous
international legal and political system itself.
Third, as in the domestic context, whether the populist allegations of
illegitimacy are normatively justifiable must depend on both, an empirical
assessment of the liberal democratic quality of (global constitutional)
authorities, as well as on the specific targets of various populists’ attacks.
Concerning the former, a normative assessment requires recognising that
the democratic dimension is arguably underdeveloped beyond the state,
where the taming of hazardous national politics through constitutional
law was long in the focus (Besson 2009). However, the ‘right of rights’ to
collectively self-determine and change normative content is an inherent
counterpart to constitutional limits on politics in liberal democracies and
even central to certain conceptions of human rights (Rovira Kaltwasser
2014; Forst 2016). Populist discourses insisting on popular sovereignty in
the global order are therefore likely to retain an irreducible normative
currency, so long as the imbalance between the (neo-)liberal and majoritar-
ian pillars of GC is not addressed by opening up IO’s inherently political
decision-making and avenues of constitutional change to more democratic
participation and contestation.
However, this does not reduce the importance of distinguishing between
varieties of populism and their specific discursive targets. Indeed, democra-
cies’ reliance onmajority rule constitutes a famous ‘underbelly’which can be
exploited by demagogic challengers seeking to erode necessary protections
against majority tyranny (Panizza 2005). In this regard, the analysis
highlighted that some types of populism undermine key principles of liberal
and democratic rights guarded at the global level. However, supporting the
viewof populism as ambivalent, it also demonstrated that populismdoes not
oppose such principles ofmajority rule coupledwithminority rights in every
case. Depending on the specific discursive targets, populist contestationmay
thus strengthen liberal-democratic ideals of GC, if it indeed supports pop-
ular sovereignty against undemocratic forms of international authority
without undermining liberal principles of individual rights and the rule
of law.
In sum, populist discourse contributes to politicising global constitutional
politics and its democratic legitimacy at the mass level. In constitutional
terms, this suggests that societies may be embarking on the process of
politically identifying and claiming the pouvoir constituant of global con-
stitutionalisation (see Niesen 2019). The ongoing political struggle about
this ‘right of rights’may thus even be part of the complex and conflictual, but
fundamentally constitutionalist project of finding ways to enshrine demo-
cratic legitimacy in global politics.
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Yet, depending on the outcomes of these contests, this politicised process
may contribute to diverse trajectories of global constitutionalisation and
de-constitutionalisation. Whereas before, global constitutionalists consid-
ered Western democracies in liberal lock step, these same democracies may
now turn out to support as legitimate more diverse – and possibly illiberal –
varieties of normative models of GC.
Against this backdrop, a central normative question lies in separating
democratically legitimate populist criticism of global constitutional short-
comings in practice from authoritarian power grabs in the name of an
illiberal twisting of democracy. In turn, a key empirical question is which
of the competing visions of legitimate global pouvoir constituant identified
here receive support from other parties, institutions and voters in different
contexts to change constitutional frameworks beyond the state.
VII. Conclusion
This article showed that the populist challenge to global constitutionalism
(GC) is more empirically varied and normatively ambivalent than its nation-
alist and authoritarian incarnations suggest. Populist challenges to global
norms binding politics depend on its host-ideological variety and can either
attack or support liberal principles beyond the state.
While a perceived lack of popular sovereignty in largely non-majoritarian
institutions of GC is lamented by all populists, contrasting types of commu-
nitarian populism and cosmopolitan populism present distinct challenges in
response, and respectively discursively undermine or strengthen
GC. Additionally, populist challenges depend on their economic views, as
neo-socialist versions of both types contest a perceived neoliberal bend in
global constitutional principles.
It is therefore neither sufficient to analyse populism as a uniformly
authoritarian and nationalist threat, nor to resort to the classic distinction
between left and right populism. In contexts of transnational politicisation
of a global constitutional order with limited elements of democratic self-
determination beyond the state, more nuanced consideration of economic
and political elements of populist discourse is needed to ascertain its chal-
lenge to GC.
Beyond advancing the analysis of various forms of populism, the main
contribution is to draw attention to the politicised process of global con-
stitutionalisation brought about by populist contestation. Breaking with
functional readings of constitutionalisation, populism opens a discursive
contest at the societal level over democratically legitimate trajectories of
GC. In contestation of global constitutional institutions perceived as
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undemocratically liberal, opposing trajectories of ‘illiberal democratic’
nationalisation and democratic strengthening of liberal principles beyond the
state compete in this politicised process of global (de-) constitutionalisation.
In sum, the populist surge is an important challenge for global constitu-
tionalism, but it is by nomeans a preordained death sentence. Rather, a dual
message emerges from this perspective: important normative questions
underlying global politics are now part of an ambivalent but no longer
avoidable public debate which can either endanger or strengthen liberal and
democratic principles. Making the case in favour of normative principles
beyond the state without overlooking legitimate discontents of global insti-
tutional practice should form an important part of this discursive contest.
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